Informal networks
News & Blog
10 Jun 2025
NewsHow informal power networks can instrumentalise anti-corruption institutions
Prevention, Research and Innovation
20 Feb 2024
BlogCulture and corruption: a complex relationship
Prevention, Research and Innovation
14 Dec 2021
NewsNew Policy Brief on how Collective Action initiatives can benefit from studying informal corrupt networks
Collective Action, Private Sector, Prevention, Research and Innovation
2 Nov 2021
BlogBribery isn’t only an exchange of money: what new research tells us about how informal networks enable corruption and vice versa
Prevention, Research and Innovation
Publications
Research Case Study 5: Harnessing behavioural approaches against corruption
Social norms and behaviour change (SNBC) approaches are a promising complement to conventional anti-corruption strategies. Adopting a context-sensitive and nuanced approach is an essential ingredient for success.
We wanted to understand if and how behavioural approaches can promote anti-corruption outcomes, as well as conditions for success.
To do this we reviewed research from 2016–2022 on the use of behavioural approaches in anti-corruption practice. We also analysed our practical experience designing and piloting an intervention to tackle social norms of reciprocity which fuel bribery in health facilities in Tanzania.
Research case study 2: Leveraging informal networks for anti-corruption in East Africa
Citizens and business people may invest significant time and money in building informal networks with public officials to overcome public service delivery shortcomings and access business opportunities. Understanding these networks better can strengthen anti-corruption efforts.
This research case study gives a brief overview of our Public Governance team’s research in Uganda and Tanzania. Through interviews, the team explored when, how and why informal networks are built and used to access public services or business opportunities corruptly.
The research project described was carried out under the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme (GI-ACE), funded with UK aid from the UK government. All results are freely shareable under a Creative Commons licence.
Informal networks as investment: A qualitative analysis from Uganda and Tanzania
Published in the peer-reviewed journal Governance, this paper interprets informal networks as investments made by citizens and business people to cope with the public sphere. Informal networks often orchestrate corruption, connecting public and private actors. The paper aims to understand their key characteristics, scopes, and functional roles.
Ten mini case studies from Tanzania and Uganda are studied. The research applies narrative analysis to explore the experiences of citizens, entrepreneurs, and low-level public officials, who built informal networks as a problem-solving mechanism. It uses a grounded theory approach. The findings serve as working hypotheses about variables and patterns emerging from the bottom-up analysis.
The paper outlines:
- Whether there are distinct types of informal networks associated with particular types of corruption;
- How, why and by whom these networks are built;
- Whether different individuals play specific roles;
- The unwritten expectations and norms that govern such networks.
The results highlight critical implications for anti-corruption practice, showing, for example, how this can be strengthened by shifting the intervention unit from individuals to networks.
About this article
This peer-reviewed article is based on extensive field research and analysis conducted by the Basel Institute’s Public Governance team in Tanzania and Uganda. The research was funded by UK Aid under the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence (GI-ACE) programme. See the links below for the open-access research outputs, including a full research report and two sets of case studies.
Policy Brief 9: Informal networks and what they mean for anti-corruption practice
Corruption is frequently associated with money alone and the behaviours of a few individual “bad apples” operating in otherwise healthy governance systems. This is too simplistic. As the latest research shows, including research in Tanzania and Uganda on which this Policy Brief is based, corruption is a networked phenomenon. This Policy Brief explains what this means and its implications for anti-corruption practice.
When ordinary citizens and business people face problems, like constrained access to public services or an uneven playing field, they invest time, effort and resources in building informal networks.
Held together by personal connections and corrupt payments, these informal networks are a problem-solving mechanism. They allow members – such as business people, other citizens and public officials – to pursue a variety of goals. The networks aid in easing access to public services, for example, or helping a business to run smoothly, or securing business opportunities with the government. Informal networks can be leveraged to speed up long and complicated permit processes or exploit weaknesses in formal tender processes to obtain undue access to contracts. When red tape is used by public officials to extort bribes from service users, informal networks can help manage and overcome these demands.
In contexts in which these informal networks are widespread, the research shows that conventional anti-corruption measures, such as introducing more regulations, policies and controls, can actually backfire and increase corruption.
Breaking this self-reinforcing cycle of networked corruption requires a shift in thinking and approaches:
- Focusing on networked corruption as opposed to individual corrupt behaviours.
- Tackling corruption both from the demand and the supply side by addressing inefficiencies and weaknesses in public systems that cause problems for ordinary citizens and business people. This may make it less likely that they will resort to corruption through informal networks to overcome the public service weaknesses.
- Harnessing informal networks for anti-corruption objectives. This includes leveraging new insights into social norms and networks and establishing Collective Action initiatives to better target the underlying drivers of corruption.
About this Policy Brief
This publication is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Policy Brief series, ISSN 2624-9669. It presents findings from a research project entitled “Harnessing informality: Designing anti-corruption network interventions and strategic use of legal instruments”, funded by UK Aid as part of the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme (GI-ACE).
It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Suggested citation: Baez Camargo, Claudia, Jacopo Costa, and Saba Kassa. 2022. “Informal networks and what they mean for anti-corruption practice.” Policy Brief 9, Basel Institute on Governance.
Quick Guide 23: Informal networks and anti-corruption
Why do many countries still struggle with high levels of corruption, in spite of years of investment in anti-corruption programmes and even where the right laws, rules and institutions are in place?
We believe one reason is that anti-corruption laws and policies are too often focused narrowly on individuals, rather than networks of individuals.
In our research, we see repeatedly how high levels of corruption are rarely the result of individual behaviour – some isolated rotten apples transgressing the formal legal order and leading others astray. Rather, corruption more frequently springs from the social norms and group dynamics of well-articulated and resilient informal networks.
And it’s those networks that have much to lose from integrity and ethics. Their behaviour as a group entrenches corruption, and they block attempts at reforms. This quick guide takes a look at what this means and the implications for anti-corruption programming.
About this Quick Guide
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
