[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":398},["ShallowReactive",2],{"news-eu-directive-political-lens":3,"news-eu-directive-political-lens-similar":128,"i-heroicons:arrow-left-20-solid":393},[4],{"id":5,"status":6,"date_created":7,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"date":12,"topic":13,"slug":14,"activity":13,"nid":13,"topics":15,"activities":13,"programme":13,"area":13,"websites":18,"language":20,"image":21,"translation_of":13,"countries":34,"tags":35,"authors":109,"images":125,"translations":126,"content":127},10633,"published","2026-06-06T14:25:32.000Z","2026-06-08T15:17:10.000Z","Corruption in the age of networks, data and influence – does the EU's new Anti-Corruption Directive rise to the challenge?","Blog","_This article by [Dr Jacopo Costa](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fabout\u002Fteam\u002Fdr-jacopo-costa\u002F) is one of two Basel Institute commentaries on the EU's new Anti-Corruption Directive._\n\n_While the companion piece examines the directive's legal and institutional implications, this article takes a political economy perspective. It considers what the directive reveals about changing understandings of corruption, how corruption risks are evolving in an increasingly interconnected and technology-driven environment, and where future EU anti-corruption efforts may need to focus._\n\n_The key message is that the directive represents an important advance in legal harmonisation, but that effective anti-corruption policy will also require stronger strategic thinking, greater use of data and technology, and closer attention to emerging corruption risks linked to procurement, border security and financial infrastructure._\n\nApril 2026, the European Union formally adopted [Directive 2026\u002F1021](https:\u002F\u002Feur-lex.europa.eu\u002Feli\u002Fdir\u002F2026\u002F1021\u002Foj\u002Feng) on combatting corruption. Following years of negotiations, political disagreements and institutional bargaining, the EU now has a comprehensive anti-corruption framework establishing common definitions, offences, sanctions and preventive measures across its member states.\n\nThis is a landmark achievement. But it would be a mistake to view the directive as the culmination of the European anti-corruption journey.\n\nIn fact, its adoption marks the beginning of a much larger challenge: turning a legal framework into an effective EU Anti-Corruption Strategy that can address the evolving forms of corruption emerging in an increasingly complex geopolitical and technological landscape.\n\n### Why the directive matters\n\nFor years, the EU lacked a coherent anti-corruption framework. Although member states had their own legislation, there were significant differences in how corruption offences were defined, investigated and punished.\n\nThese discrepancies created loopholes that could be exploited by corrupt individuals and hindered cross-border cooperation between national authorities.\n\nThe new directive aims to address these issues by introducing common minimum standards across the EU. In particular, it:\n\n-   harmonises the definitions of bribery in the public and private sectors, trading in influence, misappropriation, obstruction of justice, illicit enrichment and the concealment of criminal proceeds;\n-   introduces common standards for criminal sanctions, corporate liability, statutes of limitation, whistleblower protection, anti-corruption strategies and specialised anti-corruption bodies; and\n-   broadens the definition of public officials to encompass not only national officeholders, but also senior EU officials and individuals performing public duties on behalf of public institutions. This reflects the reality of contemporary governance, where public services are increasingly delivered through hybrid public–private arrangements.\n\nIt is the most ambitious attempt yet to establish a shared European anti-corruption framework.\n\n### A more modern understanding of corruption\n\nOne of the directive's most significant strengths is its recognition that corruption is not confined to the traditional notion of an envelope stuffed with cash being exchanged.\n\nWe welcome this change in perspective greatly, because our research demonstrates clearly that contemporary [corruption is increasingly networked, sophisticated and relational](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fblog\u002Fcorruption-complex-adaptive-network). It often relies on intermediaries, influence brokers, hidden financial channels, luxury gifts, preferential treatment, future career opportunities and informal exchanges of favours.\n\nIncluding offences such as trading in influence, illicit enrichment, concealing criminal proceeds and aiding or abetting corruption schemes shows an understanding of how corruption operates in modern societies.\n\nThis evolution is important because anti-corruption frameworks often struggle to keep up with the evolving nature of corruption. The directive is a valuable attempt to address this issue and close the resulting gap.\n\n### The price of political compromise\n\nLegislation is never produced in isolation from politics. Significant disagreements emerged among EU institutions and member states during the adoption process. Several governments expressed concerns about subsidiarity and the potential consequences of criminalising particular behaviours.\n\nSo, the final directive is less ambitious than the original proposal.\n\nOne example concerns the offence previously known as “abuse of office”. Following intense political resistance, particularly from countries such as Germany and Italy, the final text replaced it with the more cautious formulation of “unlawful exercise of public functions”. The compromise facilitated agreement, but introduced ambiguity that could hinder enforcement.\n\nSimilarly, criminal sanctions and limitation periods were reduced during negotiations. Maximum prison sentences were reduced, and statutes of limitation were scaled back considerably compared to earlier drafts.\n\nThese compromises highlight a recurring dilemma in policymaking not only in Europe but everywhere: achieving consensus often necessitates compromising on ambition. The result is a directive that establishes a common baseline, yet leaves considerable room for interpretation among member states.\n\n### The missing security lens\n\nPerhaps the most significant limitation of the directive is its relatively little guidance on what anti-corruption efforts should look like in today's rapidly changing security environment.\n\nBecause corruption is increasingly also a geopolitical and security issue. Foreign influence operations, sanctions evasion schemes, strategic corruption, illicit financial networks, organised crime infiltration and the manipulation of critical supply chains all represent corruption-related risks affecting European security and resilience.\n\nYet these challenges remain largely outside the directive's core focus. There is a risk that anti-corruption efforts will continue to focus on traditional forms of misconduct while underestimating emerging threats linked to geopolitical competition and hybrid forms of influence.\n\n### The technology gap\n\nConsidering the hype around artificial intelligence in society generally, the most striking omission in the directive is the limited attention devoted to technological innovation. Over the past decade, governments, international organisations and researchers have been exploring how artificial intelligence, big data analytics, risk indicators, predictive modelling and open-source intelligence can bolster anti-corruption initiatives.\n\nTechnology is now essential for identifying suspicious procurement patterns, pinpointing conflicts of interest, tracing illicit financial flows and exposing corruption networks. Yet the directive contains almost no strategic vision regarding the role of technology in anti-corruption governance, which is surprising.\n\nResearch conducted under the EU-funded [FALCON project](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.falcon-horizon.eu\u002F) – of which the Basel Institute is a consortium member – demonstrates that effective anti-corruption systems are increasingly dependent on digital infrastructures capable of collecting, integrating, analysing and cross-referencing large volumes of information. Without these capabilities, many corruption risks remain invisible until significant damage has already occurred.\n\nIt’s important to stress that adopting new technologies – purchasing software, etc. – is the easy part. EU states also need to create the institutional and data infrastructures that allow these technologies to function effectively. Digitisation, interoperability, standardised datasets, machine-readable information and cross-border information sharing are all prerequisites for the next generation of anti-corruption systems.\n\n### Three areas that deserve greater attention\n\nFrom our research in the following areas, we can say for sure that they deserve particular attention in the EU’s Anti-Corruption Strategy and future initiatives:\n\n**1\\. Public procurement**\n\nPublic procurement remains one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption. This issue is exacerbated by [Europe's increased investment in defence](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Foperational-credibility-is-a-strategic-asset-in-the-defence-industry-what-does-that-mean-for-ukraine-and-its-partners-2965\u002F), critical infrastructure, energy security, technological innovation and strategic industrial policies.\n\n[Central priorities](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Fhigh-level-corruption-analysis-schemes-costs-and-policy-recommendations) should include strengthening transparency, reducing direct awards, improving oversight of sub-threshold contracts, and introducing AI-based risk assessment tools.\n\n**2\\. Border governance**\n\nManaging borders and customs procedures is another critical challenge, as research at the [Port of Rotterdam](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fhow-corruption-helps-drug-traffickers-adapt-to-strengthened-border-enforcement-2848\u002F) and the [Kapitan Andreevo crossing](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fhow-stronger-borders-can-create-smarter-corruption-lessons-from-one-of-europes-most-strategic-border-crossings-2972\u002F) demonstrates. Corruption at the border facilitates a wide range of criminal activities, including smuggling, trafficking, evasion of sanctions, tax fraud and the movement of illicit goods.\n\nGreater automation, data integration and harmonisation of [border management systems](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fresources\u002Fpublications\u002Frecommendations-combatting-border-corruption-falcon-policy-brief) across member states could significantly reduce opportunities for corruption and strengthen the EU's capacity to detect emerging threats.\n\n**3\\. Financial infrastructures**\n\nModern corruption relies heavily on [financial infrastructure](https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs10610-024-09591-z). Complex financial networks, shell companies, professional intermediaries, offshore structures and, increasingly, cryptoassets can facilitate the movement and concealment of illicit funds.\n\nThe future of anti-corruption policy hinges on strengthening the links between anti-corruption and anti-money laundering frameworks, and on developing new approaches that can address digital financial ecosystems.\n\n### Will the EU’s Anti-Corruption Strategy help put the directive into action?\n\nThe adoption of Directive 2026\u002F1021 sends an important message that corruption remains a priority issue for the European Union. The directive establishes a much-needed common foundation and introduces valuable innovations to improve both prevention and enforcement. It provides a stronger legal framework than the fragmented system that existed previously.\n\nBut legal harmonisation alone will not be enough. The directive's effectiveness will ultimately depend on how member states implement its provisions, and on whether the European Union can develop a broader strategic vision capable of addressing emerging corruption risks.\n\nThis is where the forthcoming EU Anti-Corruption Strategy could play a decisive role. To be effective and not just a paper exercise, it must be adaptive, technology-driven and security-conscious. This strategy must respond to current corruption and anticipate its potential evolution.\n\nAnd it needs to be based on a participative process that considers the valuable research and perspectives of civil society organisations, academics and others outside of government.\n\nIf the directive provides the legal architecture, the strategy can provide the direction. Together, they could form the basis of a more adaptive and forward-looking European anti-corruption framework – one that is able to keep pace with a rapidly changing world.","2026-06-07",null,"eu-directive-political-lens",[16,17],"Corruption Prevention and Public Governance","Prevention Research and Innovation",[19],"Main page","English",{"id":22,"storage":23,"filename_disk":24,"filename_download":25,"title":26,"type":27,"created_on":28,"modified_on":29,"charset":13,"filesize":30,"width":31,"height":32,"duration":13,"embed":13,"description":26,"location":13,"tags":13,"metadata":33,"focal_point_x":13,"focal_point_y":13,"tus_id":13,"tus_data":13,"uploaded_on":29},"daa620e4-883a-414b-9422-156b0bf16c2b","local","daa620e4-883a-414b-9422-156b0bf16c2b.webp","EU border crossing_Jacopo blog.webp","The EU's borders are vulnerable to corruption, and deserve a prominent place in the EU's Anti-Corruption Strategy.","image\u002Fwebp","2026-06-06T14:30:40.000Z","2026-06-08T11:45:34.000Z",387454,1536,1024,{},[],[36,57,70,83,96],{"id":37,"news_id":38,"tags_id":54},6012,{"id":5,"status":6,"user_created":39,"date_created":7,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"image":22,"date":12,"topic":13,"slug":14,"activity":13,"nid":13,"topics":41,"activities":13,"programme":13,"area":13,"websites":42,"translation_of":13,"language":20,"countries":43,"tags":44,"authors":49,"images":51,"translations":52,"content":53},"545a204d-e41b-4882-afda-481ecf3fd971","115250da-6c1d-42e7-888a-fbbe909fc524",[16,17],[19],[],[37,45,46,47,48],6013,6015,6016,6019,[50],1381,[],[],[],{"id":55,"name":56},879,"Money laundering",{"id":45,"news_id":58,"tags_id":67},{"id":5,"status":6,"user_created":39,"date_created":7,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"image":22,"date":12,"topic":13,"slug":14,"activity":13,"nid":13,"topics":59,"activities":13,"programme":13,"area":13,"websites":60,"translation_of":13,"language":20,"countries":61,"tags":62,"authors":63,"images":64,"translations":65,"content":66},[16,17],[19],[],[37,45,46,47,48],[50],[],[],[],{"id":68,"name":69},967,"Organised crime",{"id":46,"news_id":71,"tags_id":80},{"id":5,"status":6,"user_created":39,"date_created":7,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"image":22,"date":12,"topic":13,"slug":14,"activity":13,"nid":13,"topics":72,"activities":13,"programme":13,"area":13,"websites":73,"translation_of":13,"language":20,"countries":74,"tags":75,"authors":76,"images":77,"translations":78,"content":79},[16,17],[19],[],[37,45,46,47,48],[50],[],[],[],{"id":81,"name":82},982,"Anti-corruption",{"id":47,"news_id":84,"tags_id":93},{"id":5,"status":6,"user_created":39,"date_created":7,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"image":22,"date":12,"topic":13,"slug":14,"activity":13,"nid":13,"topics":85,"activities":13,"programme":13,"area":13,"websites":86,"translation_of":13,"language":20,"countries":87,"tags":88,"authors":89,"images":90,"translations":91,"content":92},[16,17],[19],[],[37,45,46,47,48],[50],[],[],[],{"id":94,"name":95},1215,"Illicit financial flows",{"id":48,"news_id":97,"tags_id":106},{"id":5,"status":6,"user_created":39,"date_created":7,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"image":22,"date":12,"topic":13,"slug":14,"activity":13,"nid":13,"topics":98,"activities":13,"programme":13,"area":13,"websites":99,"translation_of":13,"language":20,"countries":100,"tags":101,"authors":102,"images":103,"translations":104,"content":105},[16,17],[19],[],[37,45,46,47,48],[50],[],[],[],{"id":107,"name":108},1373,"Corruption prevention",[110],{"id":50,"news_id":111,"authors_id":120},{"id":5,"status":6,"user_created":39,"date_created":7,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":8,"title":9,"type":10,"body":11,"image":22,"date":12,"topic":13,"slug":14,"activity":13,"nid":13,"topics":112,"activities":13,"programme":13,"area":13,"websites":113,"translation_of":13,"language":20,"countries":114,"tags":115,"authors":116,"images":117,"translations":118,"content":119},[16,17],[19],[],[37,45,46,47,48],[50],[],[],[],{"id":121,"name":122,"position":123,"image":124},304,"Dr Jacopo Costa","Senior Specialist, Prevention, Research and Innovation","90469998-3598-471d-9499-48b19f557c7d",[],[],[],[129,166,200,229,255,276,306,329,365],{"id":130,"body":131,"status":6,"type":10,"date":132,"slug":133,"title":134,"image":135,"countries":136,"topic":139,"activity":142,"tags":144,"nid":155,"topics":156,"activities":157,"authors":158,"images":159,"websites":13,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":20,"translations":160,"translation_of":13,"user_created":161,"date_created":162,"user_updated":40,"date_updated":163,"content":164,"link":165},10615,"When Bulgaria joined the European Union in 2007, many believed it would lead to more secure, transparent and less corrupt borders. New regulations, infrastructure modernisation and digitalised customs procedures all followed. European standards and money arrived together.\n\nYet corruption did not disappear at the Kapitan Andreevo border checkpoint, the main land crossing between Bulgaria and Türkiye and one of the busiest gateways between Europe and Asia. Instead, it evolved.\n\nThis is the central finding of a recent [article](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fevolution-corruption-and-crimes-kapitan-andreevo-border-checkpoint-impact-eu-accession) by the Prevention, Research and Innovation team of the Basel Institute on Governance – Dr Jacopo Costa, Dr Claudia Baez Camargo, Noémi Jäger and Dr Saba Kassa – published in the _Journal of Illicit Trade, Financial Crime, and Compliance_.\n\nThe article examines how criminal networks, smugglers, businesses and corrupt officials adapted to Bulgaria’s EU integration. It illustrates how corruption behaves like an adaptive ecosystem: when regulations and border control technologies change, corruption changes with them.\n\n## A border built for opportunity – legal and illegal\n\nBorder spaces concentrate discretionary power in the hands of customs officers, border guards, inspectors and regulators, while bringing together also traders, transport companies, migrants, smugglers, criminal groups and political actors.\n\nKapitan Andreevo is a particularly instructive case due to its strategic location, with thousands of trucks, travellers and goods passing through the border checkpoint daily.\n\nBefore Bulgaria’s EU accession, corruption at the checkpoint was already deeply embedded. The 1990s brought economic crisis, shortages of consumer goods, weak state capacity and rapidly expanding informal markets. Smuggling became a profitable survival strategy.\n\nBorder officials could be bribed to overlook undeclared goods, counterfeit products and tax evasion. Duty-free shops in the \"no man's land\" between Bulgaria and Türkiye became hubs for smuggling cigarettes, alcohol and petroleum products.\n\n## Corruption operated at multiple levels:\n\n*   everyday exchanges between traders, drivers and officials, often based on long-standing personal relationships, at the lower level\n*   connections between politicians, senior civil servants, business elites and organised crime at the higher level.\n\nSmuggling routes required political protection. Profits flowed upward through patronage systems.\n\n## EU accession changed the rules of the game\n\nBulgaria’s EU accession radically transformed the legal and institutional environment. The country had to align its customs regulations, VAT rules, excise tax systems, phytosanitary standards and border procedures with EU standards – a gradual process requiring significant investment. The reforms affected almost every aspect of border governance.\n\nCustoms procedures became increasingly digitalised. New systems such as the VAT Information Exchange System (VIES) and the Excise Movement and Control System (EMCS) improved cross-border monitoring.\n\nPhytosanitary and veterinary inspections became stricter. Migration controls tightened through alignment with Schengen rules and access to systems like the Schengen Information System (SIS) and international databases of stolen documents and vehicles.\n\nMeanwhile, new border control technologies – X-ray machines, scanners, thermal cameras and risk-analysis tools – expanded the state’s capacity to detect illicit activity.\n\nFrom a policy perspective, this appeared to be a modernisation success story. But criminal systems rarely remain static when the environment changes.\n\n## Corruption did not decline – it adapted\n\nThe most striking finding is that stronger controls often increase the strategic value of corruption.\n\nAfter EU accession, crossing the border illegally became more difficult, risky and expensive. Corruption became necessary not only to speed up procedures but to bypass sophisticated control and regulatory systems.\n\nIn other words, modernisation transformed the function of corruption: Criminal actors began targeting specialised procedures, such as food safety inspections, VAT systems, automated license plate recognition, laboratory testing and digital customs controls.\n\n## VAT fraud and the manipulation of digital systems\n\nVAT fraud illustrates this adaptation clearly. Within the EU, exports are often subject to a VAT rate of 0 (zero) percent, which means companies can reclaim any VAT they have already paid domestically. Criminal actors exploited this through \"carousel fraud\" schemes involving fictitious transactions chains.\n\nAt Kapitan Andreevo border checkpoint, for example, corruption allegedly enabled traders to manipulate customs procedures. One method involved corrupt officials manually entering fake truck registrations into customs systems to simulate border crossings, enabling fraudulent VAT refunds for exports that never occurred.\n\nEven more revealing was the manipulation of automated license plate recognition: corrupt actors reportedly disabled automated recognition and manually entered altered plates using Cyrillic characters resembling Latin letters, allowing smugglers to bypass alerts and inspections.\n\nThis illustrates a pattern seen in many modern corruption systems: digitalisation does not automatically eliminate corruption. Instead, corruption turns towards the technological systems themselves.\n\n## Food safety, privatisation and rent-seeking\n\nEU food safety and phytosanitary regulations created new bottlenecks and forms of discretionary authority. The research describes two recurring manipulation strategies:\n\n*   selective sampling during inspections, where officials took samples only from \"clean\" sections of shipments; and\n*   falsification of laboratory tests to certify unsafe products as compliant.\n\nThese risks increased after some border functions were outsourced to private companies. At Kapitan Andreevo, food testing, parking operations and vehicle disinfection were privatised. This reform, intended to increase efficiency, allegedly created new opportunities for rent extraction.\n\nThe controversy surrounding Eurolab 2011, which reportedly obtained monopolistic control over food safety testing under questionable legal arrangements became emblematic of these tensions.\n\nThe broader implication: privatisation of public functions does not necessarily reduce corruption risks. It can shift them into hybrid public-private arrangements where accountability is weaker and oversight is more fragmented.\n\n## The rise of “routinised” corruption\n\nThe study highlights the increased organisation of corruption itself. Today, no single official can independently guarantee a smuggling route. Procedures involve multiple agencies, overlapping inspections and layered oversight.\n\nAs a result, corruption evolved towards collective coordination. Customs officers, border guards, supervisors, intermediaries and sometimes political actors participate in networks where bribes are pooled and redistributed.\n\nThese schemes resemble coordinated organisational systems with revenue-sharing mechanisms, internal hierarchies and protection structures rather than isolated rogue actors.\n\nThis reflects an important conceptual change: border corruption can function as an embedded institutional ecosystem sustained through cooperation, mutual dependence and political protection.\n\n## Drug trafficking: when corruption becomes too risky\n\nInterestingly, corruption is not always the preferred strategy. In drug trafficking, for example, the risks are dramatically higher. Border officials caught facilitating drug trafficking could face severe criminal penalties, including organised crime charges and lengthy prison sentences.\n\nAs a result, traffickers increasingly invest in sophisticated concealment methods. One example is the \"twin trucks\" strategy: several nearly identical trucks carrying similar cargo cross the border simultaneously during heavy traffic, with only one of them containing drugs. Since inspection capacity is limited, the probability is high that the \"clean\" trucks are checked while the drug shipment passes undetected.\n\nThis shows that corruption and criminality do not always go hand in hand. Sometimes, stronger anti-corruption measures push criminals towards deception and concealment rather than bribery.\n\n## The bigger lesson: criminal systems are adaptive\n\nThe case study of the Kapitan Andreevo border crossing is not just about Bulgaria. Policymakers often assume that more technology, controls and regulation will automatically reduce corruption and illicit trade.\n\nBut criminal systems and corruption adapt. Informal networks reorganise around the vulnerabilities created by reforms. Every regulatory innovation creates new incentives, bottlenecks and opportunities for exploitation.\n\nThis does not mean reforms are useless. Many EU measures have clearly strengthened border management. However, reforms must be designed with an understanding of adaptive behaviour. Otherwise, states risk producing unintended consequences: stronger incentives for bribery, use of alternative trafficking routes, technological manipulation, new forms of collusion or opaque privatisation structures.\n\nI and my co-authors argue for a more integrated approach that combines anti-corruption and anti-crime strategies. We also emphasise the importance of anticipatory governance and foresight-oriented policymaking that try to predict how illicit actors will respond to institutional changes before reforms are implemented.\n\nThis may be the most important lesson from Kapitan Andreevo. Borders are not static lines defended by static institutions against static threats. They are evolving ecosystems where states, markets, technologies and criminal actors constantly adapt to one another.\n\n### Learn more\n\n*   Access the full article, “[The Evolution of Corruption and Crimes at Kapitan Andreevo Border Checkpoint: The Impact of EU Accession](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fevolution-corruption-and-crimes-kapitan-andreevo-border-checkpoint-impact-eu-accession)”.\n*   Read our [Quick Guide 38 to border corruption](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fqg38) for a short introduction.\n*   Read our Working Paper 58, “Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam” for a related analysis.","2026-05-26","how-stronger-borders-can-create-smarter-corruption-lessons-from-one-of-europes-most-strategic-border-crossings-2972","How stronger borders can create smarter corruption: lessons from one of Europe's most strategic border crossings","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F693afaed-084c-4590-aafd-c2d51b28adf7?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[137,138],7814,7815,[140,141],"Prevention"," Research and Innovation",[143],"Insights",[145,149,151],{"tags_id":146},{"id":147,"name":148},859,"Corruption risks",{"tags_id":150},{"id":81,"name":82},{"tags_id":152},{"id":153,"name":154},1374,"Law enforcement",2972,[17],[143],[107],[],[],"03bebfd8-0b40-4a2a-820d-b9d9c13b9de6","2026-06-04T21:13:44.000Z","2026-06-08T13:41:46.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fhow-stronger-borders-can-create-smarter-corruption-lessons-from-one-of-europes-most-strategic-border-crossings-2972",{"id":167,"body":168,"status":6,"type":10,"date":169,"slug":170,"title":171,"image":172,"countries":173,"topic":174,"activity":175,"tags":178,"nid":181,"topics":182,"activities":183,"authors":184,"images":185,"websites":13,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":20,"translations":186,"translation_of":13,"user_created":161,"date_created":187,"user_updated":188,"date_updated":189,"content":190,"link":199},10607,"Corruption is not just a collection of isolated acts by individuals. It is a complex, adaptive system that evolves in response to efforts to control it. And seeing it this way opens up new possibilities to tackle it more effectively.\n\nThis was the central message of a recent Basel Institute on Governance research webinar exploring how corruption evolves and what this means for designing interventions that remain effective over time.\n\nTwo senior researchers from the Basel Institute's Prevention, Research and Innovation – Dr Claudia Baez Camargo and Dr Jacopo Costa – were joined by Dr Maria Nizzero, Head of Sanctions Policy at UK Finance and Associate Research Fellow at RUSI, to explore corruption's networked nature and its implications.\n\nThese implications are practical as much as conceptual. Understanding corruption as a networked, adaptive system changes how corruption, organised crime, sanctions evasion and related threats need to be addressed in practice.\n\n### Corruption as a dynamic system\n\nA recent [academic paper](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fconceptualizing-evolution-corruption-empirical-analysis-italy) by Dr Baez Camargo and Dr Costa highlights a key gap in how corruption is typically analysed. While it is widely accepted that corrupt and criminal strategies change over time, the mechanisms driving that change have received far less attention.\n\nTheir analytical framework suggests that corruption evolves through changes in the behaviour of individuals within networks, shaped by shifts in the broader environment. These shifts may include stronger enforcement, legal and regulatory reforms, technological developments, or wider political and economic change. When new strategies prove effective, they spread across networks through collaboration, brokerage and imitation.\n\nA case study of Italy illustrates this process. In the early 1990s, corruption operated through relatively centralised, pyramidal structures linked to political parties. Over time, following scandals, reforms and increased scrutiny, this system became more fragmented and decentralised. Corrupt practices moved away from formalised exchanges and became more networked, informal and embedded in relationships.\n\nThe outcome was not less corruption, but different corruption.\n\nAs Dr Costa noted, corruption and anti-corruption are engaged in an “uninterrupted dance”, in which “very often, corrupt actors are two steps ahead of us”.\n\n### The concept of the “kleptocratic enterprise”\n\nLooking at corruption through a network lens also opens up new ways of thinking about how to tackle it.\n\n[Research by Dr Nizzero and co-authors](https:\u002F\u002Fgiace.org\u002Fwp-content\u002Fuploads\u002F2026\u002F01\u002FGIACE_Kleptocratic-Enterprises_NizzeroHeathershawMayne.pdf) Professor John Heathershaw and Professor Tom Mayne highlights the persistent challenges of asset recovery and enforcement in cases of large-scale corruption. Illicit wealth is often concealed through complex ownership structures, dispersed across jurisdictions and distanced from its original source over time. Legal frameworks may exist, but applying them effectively remains difficult.\n\nA key part of the problem lies in the role of professional service providers. Lawyers, accountants, real estate actors, company service providers and others help move, manage and shield assets. These actors often operate across borders and may serve a wide range of clients, including both organised crime groups and politically exposed individuals.\n\nThis has led to the idea of a “kleptocratic enterprise”: a networked system in which clients demand services such as concealment and asset protection, and a range of actors supply those services. Viewing corruption in this way shifts attention towards patterns of conduct, relationships and enabling structures.\n\nIt also suggests that tools used to tackle organised crime, such as anti-racketeering or anti-mafia approaches, may offer useful insights. These frameworks often focus on networks rather than individuals, combine multiple legal tools and allow for a broader understanding of harm, including the impact on society.\n\nAt the same time, responses must remain grounded in due process and the rule of law. Stronger measures can create new risks, including displacement of illicit activity to other jurisdictions or unintended consequences linked to overreach. The challenge is to expand the toolkit without compromising core legal principles.\n\n### When enforcement creates new risks\n\nField research by the Basel Institute under the EU-funded [FALCON project](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.falcon-horizon.eu\u002F) shows how quickly corrupt and criminal networks adapt to enforcement pressure.\n\nAt the [Port of Rotterdam](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-58), increased inspections and surveillance aimed at tackling drug trafficking made insider access more valuable. Corruption became a critical mechanism for bypassing strengthened controls, illustrating how enforcement can shift incentives in ways that reinforce the role of corruption.\n\nAt the Kapitan Andreevo border crossing between Bulgaria and Turkey, changes linked to EU accession, including new regulatory frameworks and stronger border controls, were followed by new forms of corruption and criminal activity. These included routinised extractive practices, shifts in smuggling strategies and the emergence of new actors.\n\nAcross both cases, the pattern is consistent. Measures designed to reduce corruption and illicit activity can reshape how those activities are organised and carried out.\n\n### Why networks are so resilient\n\nOne reason corruption adapts so effectively lies in the nature of the networks themselves.\n\nAs Dr Baez Camargo explains, enforcement-focused approaches can become a “whack-a-mole game” when underlying incentives remain unchanged. Efforts to close one avenue often lead to the emergence of another.\n\n[Informal networks](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fquick-guide-23-informal-networks-and-anti-corruption) are particularly resilient because they are built on more than financial exchange. Trust, personal relationships and shared social norms play a central role. These elements are difficult to detect, harder to regulate and highly adaptable.\n\nCriminal and corrupt networks are also flexible and opportunistic. They can shift strategies, routes and methods quickly, drawing on significant resources and expertise. Formal institutions, by contrast, operate within legal and procedural constraints, which can limit their ability to respond at the same pace.\n\n### Towards more adaptive responses\n\nIf corruption behaves like a complex adaptive system, anti-corruption efforts need to reflect that reality.\n\nOne emerging approach is to place greater emphasis on understanding systems rather than focusing narrowly on individual interventions. This involves mapping relationships, incentives and behavioural patterns in much greater depth, and remaining alert to how these evolve over time.\n\nIt also requires a shift away from strictly linear theories of change. Fixed indicators and predefined outcomes can miss important developments, particularly when systems are dynamic and interconnected. A more flexible approach allows practitioners to identify early signals of change, whether positive or negative, and adjust their strategies accordingly.\n\nAs Dr Baez Camargo puts it, “we cannot keep thinking that change is linear”. A better understanding of systems, combined with the ability to detect and respond to change, is essential for staying relevant in rapidly evolving contexts.\n\n### A shift in perspective\n\nTaken together, these insights point to a broader conclusion. Corruption is not static, and responses to it cannot be static either.\n\nUnderstanding corruption as a networked, adaptive system changes how problems are defined and how solutions are designed. It brings greater attention to relationships, incentives and enabling structures. It also highlights the importance of anticipating how systems will respond to interventions.\n\nFor practitioners working on corruption, organised crime or related risks, this shift is increasingly important. Integrating it into programming should help us not only respond more quickly as corruption adapts – i.e. whack the moles more rapidly when they pop up. It should also help us design flexible, creative and context-sensitive interventions that can genuinely disrupt these resilient illicit networks and themselves adapt to remain effective over time.\n\n### Learn more\n\n*   [Conceptualizing the evolution of corruption: an empirical analysis from Italy](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fconceptualizing-evolution-corruption-empirical-analysis-italy), by Dr Jacopo Costa and Dr Claudia Baez Camargo.\n*   [Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-58), by Dr Saba Kassa and Dr Jacopo Costa \n*   [The Kleptocratic Enterprise: Lessons from organised crime to target transnational corruption and strengthen asset recovery in the UK](https:\u002F\u002Fgiace.org\u002Fwp-content\u002Fuploads\u002F2026\u002F01\u002FGIACE_Kleptocratic-Enterprises_NizzeroHeathershawMayne.pdf), by Dr Maria Nizzero, Professor John Heathershaw and Professor Tom Mayne\n\n### Webinar recording\n\n\u003Ciframe allowfullscreen=\"\" frameborder=\"0\" height=\"315\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.youtube.com\u002Fembed\u002FETQto16U_q4?si=yrjbtCTRmQ5ceTPo\" title=\"YouTube video player\" width=\"560\">\u003C\u002Fiframe>\n\nDisclaimer\n\n_This webinar and summary are part of the FALCON (Fight Against Largescale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks) project. FALCON is funded under the European Union’s Horizon Europe Framework Program Grant Agreement ID 101121281. The Basel Institute on Governance, as an associated partner without the right to receive funds directly from the European Research Executive Agency, has received funding from the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI). The contents of this summary are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union, the European Research Executive Agency or SERI._","2026-03-25","corruption-is-a-complex-adaptive-network-what-does-this-mean-for-anti-corruption-policy-and-practice-2945","Corruption is a complex, adaptive network. What does this mean for anti-corruption policy and practice?","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Faf37ba1d-85e1-4724-ab47-4e58056330c6?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[],[140,141],[176,177],"Events","Research",[179],{"tags_id":180},{"id":81,"name":82},2945,[17],[176,177],[],[],[],"2026-04-15T22:45:18.000Z","3d9ff205-1640-4f34-b5b6-86977f51bbd6","2026-05-07T21:29:58.000Z",[191,192,193,194,195,196,197,198],1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fcorruption-is-a-complex-adaptive-network-what-does-this-mean-for-anti-corruption-policy-and-practice-2945",{"id":201,"body":202,"status":6,"type":10,"date":203,"slug":204,"title":205,"image":206,"countries":207,"topic":13,"activity":13,"tags":208,"nid":13,"topics":209,"activities":214,"authors":215,"images":217,"websites":218,"area":219,"programme":222,"language":20,"translations":224,"translation_of":13,"user_created":39,"date_created":225,"user_updated":188,"date_updated":226,"content":227,"link":228},10590,"This feature appears in the 2025 Basel AML Index Public Edition report. \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Findex.baselgovernance.org\u002Fdownloads\">Download the full report and related resources\u003C\u002Fa>.\n\n\u003Cblockquote>\n\u003Ch3>Key takeaways\u003C\u002Fh3>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Understanding national risks linked to virtual assets is now essential\u003C\u002Fstrong>, as their use has moved from niche to mainstream and is increasingly exploited for financial crime. \u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Risk assessments are inherently challenging \u003C\u002Fstrong>as (a) virtual assets are borderless by design, (b) large parts of the ecosystem fall outside regulation and (c) reliable national-level data remains limited. \u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Illicit activity involving virtual assets does not take place in isolation\u003C\u002Fstrong>: offenders exploit the same weaknesses – corruption, fraud, weak supervision and poor enforcement – that already undermine the wider financial system. \u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>The Basel AML Index provides valuable indicators to assess both a jurisdiction’s structural vulnerabilities and its capacity to counter threats \u003C\u002Fstrong>related to financial crimes in general, including those related to virtual assets, even though it does not include a dedicated virtual assets risk indicator. \u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003C\u002Fblockquote>\n\n\u003Cem>Note: in this article we use the term virtual assets in line with the FATF’s \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Ftopics\u002Fvirtual-assets.html\">definition\u003C\u002Fa> of “any digital representation of value that can be digitally traded, transferred or used for payment”. The terms crypto, cryptoassets, digital assets, digital currencies, etc. form part of this loose family, though they are often defined differently in different contexts – a factor that also complicates risk assessments and data analysis.\u003C\u002Fem>\n\n\u003Ch3>\u003Cstrong>Why assessing risks related to virtual assets matters \u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fh3>\n\nGovernments and private firms alike are under growing pressure to understand the risks associated with virtual assets. What was once a niche is becoming a mainstream part of financial markets and a common feature in all forms of financial crime.\n\nAs the virtual assets industry continues to mature, national authorities that lack a clear understanding of the risks find themselves on the back foot when drafting legislation, supervising market participants or countering financial crime.\n\nFor financial institutions, a clear picture of jurisdiction-level risk is essential for customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, calibrating controls and taking strategic decisions about where or where not to operate. Financial institutions that misjudge these risks leave themselves exposed to illicit finance, reputational harm and potential regulatory action.\n\n\u003Ch3>Why jurisdiction-level risk assessments are difficult\u003C\u002Fh3>\n\n\u003Ch4>1. A borderless system by design\u003C\u002Fh4>\n\nUnlike bank accounts or trust funds, virtual asset wallets or addresses do not have a meaningful jurisdictional location. There is no crypto equivalent of “a bank account in Switzerland”. A wallet can be accessed anywhere and may be controlled by a person or entity whose location is unknown or easily obscured. Large parts of the virtual asset ecosystem also fall outside the boundaries of traditional financial regulation. Self-hosted wallets, peer-to-peer transfers, decentralised finance (DeFi) protocols and informal over-the-counter (OTC) brokers create pockets of activity that are largely invisible. Any jurisdiction-level assessment will inevitably be incomplete.\n\nThe activities of virtual asset service providers (VASPs) further complicate matters. A VASP may be established in one jurisdiction while primarily serving customers in another. In the absence of harmonised legislation or cooperation among supervisors, many operate across numerous markets with minimal physical presence or regulatory engagement.\n\n\u003Ch4>2. Data is limited, patchy and uncertain\u003C\u002Fh4>\n\nReliable quantitative data on financial crime risks related to virtual assets at the national level is scarce. In addition to the issue of contrasting definitions and the technology’s borderless nature, several factors contribute to this lack.\n\nFirst, commercial blockchain analytics providers publish broad indicators of virtual asset adoption and estimates of illicit usage. These can be helpful for spotting trends but require careful interpretation. They rely on estimates and proxies, including web traffic to exchanges or intermediaries, and do not provide precise amounts or reliably distinguish licit from illicit activity.\n\nSecond, it is reasonable to assume that where adoption rises, illicit activity will also increase, simply because criminals use the same infrastructure as legitimate users. However, such relationships cannot be measured with confidence.\n\nThird, at the government level, many jurisdictions still lack a coordinated approach across authorities to collect, share and analyse statistics on money laundering and related financial crimes. In many jurisdictions, data on virtual assets is either not gathered consistently or not collected at all.\n\nWithout reliable data on virtual assets usage and risks, national risk assessments may become detached from real-world threats. The result: regulation and supervision that is either insufficient or unnecessarily burdensome.\n\n### How the Basel AML Index can be used\n\nFor the above reasons, the Basel AML Index does not offer a dedicated indicator for virtual assets. Nevertheless, the Index data is still useful because illicit activity involving virtual assets typically exploits the same underlying weaknesses that enable money laundering, corruption, fraud and other financial crimes in the traditional financial system. Where protections against fraud are weak, for example, where supervision is lacking or where enforcement of regulations is inconsistent or politically compromised, opportunities to misuse virtual assets for illegal purposes tend to expand.\n\n\u003Cblockquote>\n\u003Cstrong>Two components of risk \u003C\u002Fstrong>\n\nIn line with the holistic methodology of the Basel AML Index and most AML\u002FCFT risk assessment frameworks, evaluating jurisdiction-level risk related to virtual assets centres on two elements:\n\n\u003Cp>a) \u003Cem>vulnerability \u003C\u002Fem>to the illicit use of virtual assets; and b) \u003Cem>capacity to mitigate \u003C\u002Fem>and respond to these threats. \u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003C\u002Fblockquote>\n\n### Relevant indicators\n\nThe following graphic highlights indicators of the Basel AML Index that are relevant for assessing either \u003Cem>structural vulnerabilities \u003C\u002Fem>that illicit actors may exploit, or a jurisdiction’s \u003Cem>capacity to counter \u003C\u002Fem>threats. These can be viewed individually in the Expert Edition.\n\n![](https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F7f446525-136f-4018-a322-8a4e8872f23b) *Indicators visible in the Basel AML Index Edition that are particularly relevant to assessing national risks relating to virtual assets.*\n\n\n#### FATF data\n\nUsing the Expert Edition Plus subscription and its quantitative analysis of the latest FATF mutual evaluation and follow-up reports, Basel AML Index users can gain rapid insights into whether a jurisdiction’s AML\u002FCFT framework provides it with the capacity to \u003Cem>counter threats \u003C\u002Fem>related to financial crimes generally, including those involving virtual assets. FATF Recommendations that may be highly relevant for this include:\n\n- R.15 (new technologies)\n- R.16 (payment transparency)\n- R.26 & 27 (regulation and supervision)\n- R.29–31 (law enforcement)\n- R.36–40 (international cooperation)\n\nAn additional useful source of information for jurisdiction-level risk assessments is the FATF’s \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fatf-gafi.org\u002Fen\u002Fpublications\u002FFatfrecommendations\u002Ftargeted-update-virtual-assets-vasps-2025.html\">\u003Cem>2025 Targeted Update on Implementation of the FATF Standards on Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers\u003C\u002Fem>\u003C\u002Fa>. This report summarises progress in implementing FATF Recommendation 15 by FATF members and additional jurisdictions with materially important global virtual asset activity. “Materially important” refers to the presence of large VASPs (accounting for more than 0.25 percent of global trading) and\u002For a large virtual asset user base.\n\n### Where to start\n\nFor jurisdictions at an early stage of assessing national risks related to virtual assets, the World Bank’s \u003Cem>\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fopenknowledge.worldbank.org\u002Fentities\u002Fpublication\u002Fbb5a7475-ac52-4697-afdc-5f618a550623\">AML\u002FCFT National Risk Assessment on Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers: Guidance Manual\u003C\u002Fa> \u003C\u002Fem>(published in October 2025) is a strong starting point. It covers both threats and vulnerabilities, as well as the effectiveness of mitigation measures.\n\nAdditional useful resources include:\n- \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002F9crc-crypto-regulation\">\u003Cstrong>Practical recommendations from regulators and supervisors\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fa>, developed at the 9th Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptoassets, on understanding financial crime risks linked to virtual assets and designing effective regulatory and supervisory frameworks.\n- \u003Cstrong>Structured public–private partnerships\u003C\u002Fstrong>, such as the \u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fefippp.eu\u002F\">Europol Financial Intelligence Sharing Public Private Partnership\u003C\u002Fa>, which offer opportunities to learn from peers and obtain early insights into emerging threats and financial crime typologies involving virtual assets.\n","2025-12-08","assessing-national-risks-related-to-virtual-assets","Assessing national risks related to virtual assets","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F78f8a1ec-bf8d-469a-ab92-228e79ddd8f2?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[],[],[210,211,212,16,213],"Anti-Money Laundering","Asset Recovery and Enforcement","Business Integrity Ethics and Compliance","Basel AML Index",[213,177],[216],1365,[],[213],[220,221],"Asset Recovery & Enforcement","Business Integrity & Governance",[223],"International Centre for Asset Recovery",[],"2025-12-05T11:43:36.000Z","2026-06-07T10:31:25.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fassessing-national-risks-related-to-virtual-assets",{"id":230,"body":231,"status":6,"type":232,"date":233,"slug":234,"title":235,"image":236,"countries":237,"topic":238,"activity":240,"tags":243,"nid":244,"topics":245,"activities":247,"authors":248,"images":249,"websites":13,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":20,"translations":250,"translation_of":13,"user_created":161,"date_created":251,"user_updated":188,"date_updated":252,"content":253,"link":254},10581,"We are pleased to announce the launch of a special crowdfunding campaign on the day of what would have been Gretta Fenner’s 50th birthday.\n\nThe campaign supports the Gretta Fenner Scholarship Fund, which enables talented individuals from lower-income backgrounds to access our advanced anti-corruption programmes.\n\nYou can [visit and share the campaign page here](https:\u002F\u002Fwhydonate.com\u002Ffundraising\u002Fgretta-fenner-scholarship-fund).\n\n### Gretta’s commitment to education and integrity\n\nOur long-serving and inspiring leader of two decades, [Gretta Fenner](https:\u002F\u002Fgretta.baselgovernance.org\u002F), understood the value and power of education. She invested boldly on behalf of the Basel Institute in [Basel STUDY](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fstudy) – academic programmes with the University of Basel – to help build tomorrow’s leaders in the fight against corruption and financial crime.\n\nGretta was inspired by the people she met in every corner of the world and in every profession during her famously whirlwind travels. She recognised the potential in individuals who showed initiative, talent and the inner fire to pursue impactful careers strengthening governance and transparency and combating corruption and financial crime.\n\nShe wanted to open the door to meaningful education and lifelong learning beyond school or university, beyond short courses, videos and slides.\n\n### Investing in future leaders\n\nAll of us at the Basel Institute share this belief. Each of us can tell a story of how education, peer networks and continuous learning have shaped our careers and opened new opportunities.\n\nThis is why we are asking for your support for the Scholarship Fund named in Gretta’s honour. \n\nThe [Scholarship Fund](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fstudy\u002Fscholarship) supports applicants from lower-income backgrounds who show a strong commitment to anti-corruption, transparency and good governance in their fields or communities. All funds raised go towards these students' tuition fees and, in some cases, travel to Basel for in-person course launch and closing events.\n\n### The Fund’s impact\n\nOne Scholarship recipient starting our first anti-corruption course spoke of his determination to _“…resolve anti-corruption challenges from an African perspective”_, while another shared how _“this prestigious study programme… offers a forum to learn from professionals who are influencing the global conversation on anti-corruption.”_\n\nShe acknowledged:\n\n> _“This educational journey would not have been possible without the support of the Gretta Fenner Scholarship Fund.”_\n\n### How to support\n\nIf education or the generosity of others have ever shaped your life, please consider giving – or inviting others to give – before the year ends.\n\nWith a target of CHF 100,000, we aim to fund up to 20 scholarships in 2026 and help advance Gretta’s vision for global peace, stability and sustainability.\n\nTo donate or share the campaign with your networks, please visit the [Gretta Fenner Scholarship Fund platform](https:\u002F\u002Fwhydonate.com\u002Ffundraising\u002Fgretta-fenner-scholarship-fund).","News","2025-11-22","launch-of-the-gretta-fenner-scholarship-fund-campaign-changing-lives-through-education-2875","Launch of the Gretta Fenner Scholarship Fund campaign: Changing lives through education","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F12330f9e-9b30-45fa-8526-a88cc7e84302?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[],[239,140,141],"Asset Recovery",[176,241,242],"Training","Partnerships",[],2875,[211,17,246],"Learning and training",[176,241,242],[],[],[],"2025-11-21T17:01:43.000Z","2026-06-06T09:17:51.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Flaunch-of-the-gretta-fenner-scholarship-fund-campaign-changing-lives-through-education-2875",{"id":256,"body":257,"status":6,"type":232,"date":258,"slug":259,"title":260,"image":261,"countries":262,"topic":263,"activity":264,"tags":266,"nid":267,"topics":268,"activities":269,"authors":270,"images":271,"websites":13,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":20,"translations":272,"translation_of":13,"user_created":161,"date_created":273,"user_updated":188,"date_updated":252,"content":274,"link":275},10573,"The Basel Institute’s first international postgraduate programme in anti-corruption has begun. 12 students from 11 countries across Africa, Europe and North America are taking part in the six-month course, led by Basel Institute staff and resulting in a Certificate of Advanced Studies from the University of Basel.\n\nThe course, [Mastering Today’s Anti-Corruption Challenges](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Flearning\u002Fbasel-study\u002Fcas-anti-corruption), equips mid-career professionals with the tools, skills and networks to address corruption and governance challenges in their work.\n\nLead instructor Dr Claudia Baez Camargo, Director of the Institute’s Prevention, Research and Innovation team, explained:\n\n> Through this programme, participants will not only deepen their understanding of corruption in today’s complex world, but also learn to evaluate the real evidence on what works. Most importantly, they will be empowered to apply these insights with confidence in their own countries and professional contexts, helping to strengthen integrity and good governance where it matters most.\n\n### Shaping the next generation of anti-corruption leaders\n\nThree participants attended the opening event on 26–27 September in person in Basel, while those unable to travel joined the sessions online.\n\nThe first cohort is made up of peers with diverse academic backgrounds – including legal, economic, political and other disciplines – and professional experience in the public, private and civil society sectors, in multilateral organisations and the media.\n\nThey were welcomed by the Basel Institute’s President Peter Maurer and Executive Director Betsy Andersen, together with the Basel STUDY team and instructors.\n\nVisits to the University of Basel and the historic centre gave participants and instructors the chance to bond while exploring Swiss traditions.\n\nThe participants who attended the launch in person described themselves as:\n\n> “excited”, “grateful” and “honoured”.\n\nAsked what she hoped to get out of the course, Tamara Lee, a Business Analyst and Project Manager from Ireland, said:\n\n> I hope I’ll learn to see corruption issues with a sharper, more professional lens. Instead of falling back on the usual buzzwords or the kind of surface-level ideas we see on social media or hear in conversations, I’d like to be able to look at situations in a deeper, more critical way.\n\nDr Ramadhani Marijani, a Senior Lecturer and Researcher at Tanzania’s University of Dodoma, added: \n\n> I hope I can be able to resolve anti-corruption challenges from an African perspective and understand other challenges in the global sphere. I am looking forward to engaging in classes, sharing and learning from other fellow participants from Africa and other countries and from the community of practice fighting the war against corruption globally.\n\nIlinca-Ioana Bīlc, Legal Advisor at a bank in Romania, emphasised her desire to explore a holistic approach to anti-corruption: \n\n> I want to know how I can fight \\[corruption\\] from different angles besides the basic one that everyone expects: you just follow the guidelines and then there will be no corruption. When in fact, the problem is much bigger and we need way more different ways of tackling it. \n\n### Exploring corruption’s links to today’s greatest challenges\n\nSaturday’s classroom sessions with Dr Saba Kassa explored how corruption connects to today’s greatest concerns, from shifting geopolitics and democratic backsliding to migration and climate change. This sets the foundation for modules delivered in live online sessions over the next six months and covering:\n\n*   How corruption and governance impact states, societies and organisations.\n*   The fundamentals of anti-corruption practice, from legal instruments to effective enforcement and prevention.\n*   Novel approaches to anti-corruption, drawing on political and behavioural sciences.\n*   How anti-corruption strategies are implemented internationally – and how they could be made more effective.\n\nStudents will apply their knowledge through a personal study project on a corruption challenge of their choice.\n\n### Scholarship fund opens doors to global talent\n\nSeveral participants benefited from tuition support thanks to generous donors to the [Gretta Fenner Scholarship Fund](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Flearning\u002Fbasel-study\u002Fscholarship).\n\nThe fund supports applicants from lower-income backgrounds who show strong commitment to anti-corruption, transparency and good governance. It reflects the vision of the Basel Institute’s late Managing Director Gretta Fenner to educate and empower anti-corruption leaders everywhere, regardless of financial means.\n\nOne recipient is Nigerian lawyer Emmanuela OkonkwoAbutu of the Abuja-based African Centre for Governance, Asset Recovery and Sustainable Development. She shared:\n\n> This prestigious study programme... offers a forum to learn from professionals who are influencing the global conversation on anti-corruption… This educational journey would not have been possible without the support of the Gretta Fenner Scholarship Fund.\n\nWe are grateful to The International Academy of Financial Crime Litigators, the Academy’s co-founders Elizabeth Ortega (ECO Strategic Communications), Stéphane Bonifassi (Bonifassi Avocats) and Lincoln Caylor (Bennett Jones), as well as Swiss law firm Kellerhals Carrard for their generous donations to the Fund.\n\n### Expanding opportunities through Basel STUDY\n\n[Basel STUDY](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Flearning\u002Fbasel-study) – the Basel Institute’s postgraduate programme initiative – is designed to boost the knowledge, skills and careers of professionals committed to countering corruption and financial crime.\n\nIt builds on the Institute’s long-standing capacity-building approach, encouraging peer learning, hands-on practice and real-life cases. The two available Certificate of Advanced Studies programmes combine this practitioner-led spirit with the academic rigour of the University of Basel.\n\nThe second course, [_Combating_ _Financial Crime Through Asset Recovery_](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Flearning\u002Fbasel-study\u002Fcas-asset-recovery), starts in February 2026. Applications remain open for self-funded or employer-funded participants.\n\n### Learn more\n\n*   Explore other learning opportunities at the Basel Institute, including free eLearning courses on [Basel LEARN](https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002F), our four-day course on [crypto, financial crime and AML compliance](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcrypto-aml-training), and our flagship [asset recovery training programmes](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fasset-recovery\u002Ftraining-programmes) for law enforcement agencies.\n*   Learn about the [Gretta Fenner Scholarship Fund](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Flearning\u002Fbasel-study\u002Fscholarship) – and consider donating to help change lives and create impact!","2025-09-29","global-professionals-begin-new-anti-corruption-studies-2851","Global professionals begin new anti-corruption studies","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002Fbe4b8143-bba3-4760-8f60-d11dcedc3f7b?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[],[140,141],[265,241],"Courses",[],2851,[16,17,246],[265,241],[],[],[],"2025-09-29T16:01:39.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fglobal-professionals-begin-new-anti-corruption-studies-2851",{"id":277,"body":278,"status":6,"type":10,"date":279,"slug":280,"title":281,"image":282,"countries":283,"topic":285,"activity":286,"tags":287,"nid":294,"topics":295,"activities":296,"authors":297,"images":300,"websites":13,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":20,"translations":301,"translation_of":13,"user_created":161,"date_created":302,"user_updated":188,"date_updated":303,"content":304,"link":305},10572,"Corruption at border points remains a pressing global issue, threatening not only border integrity but also the health, safety and security of our societies. It enables illicit trafficking, facilitates organised crime and undermines trust in public institutions.\n\nIn our _[Working Paper 58](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-58)_, Saba Kassa and Jacopo Costa examine how corruption facilitates drug trafficking through the port of Rotterdam.\n\nThrough in-depth interviews with stakeholders, a review of judicial cases and desk research, the paper shows how trafficking and corruption strategies are changing in response to strengthened enforcement at border spaces.\n\nIt contributes to the growing body of work that looks at corruption from a systemic viewpoint, analysing the relationships and adaptive capabilities that allow organised crime to thrive.\n\nThe Working Paper was written as part of the [FALCON](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.falcon-horizon.eu\u002F) (Fight Against Large-scale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks) project. The research supports efforts to develop more robust and forward-looking approaches to combat corruption and drug trafficking.\n\nRead the executive summary below.\n\n### Unintended consequences of strengthened enforcement\n\nThis Working Paper examines how corruption facilitates drug trafficking (specifically cocaine) through the port of Rotterdam, looking at the underlying drivers and strategies involved.\n\nLegal trade routes and commercial ports are especially attractive because of the high volumes of cargo, which make it possible to conceal illicit cargo under licit cargo. The spatial complexity of the port of Rotterdam also makes it difficult to fully secure it against criminal activity.\n\nDigging deeper into the facilitating factors of trafficking, the paper finds that, paradoxically, a main driver of rising border corruption is the increased political attention on and resources dedicated to fighting trafficking.\n\nDesk research and stakeholder interviews highlight that as authorities deploy new technology to improve detection, traffickers face more obstacles to operating effectively.\n\nHaving someone on the inside then becomes increasingly important. So, an unintended but important consequence of the strengthened fight against drug trafficking is that corruption becomes even more essential for the operational success of organised crime networks.\n\n### Customs officials are specifically vulnerable\n\nThis study focuses specifically on the role of customs. Tasked with monitoring the import and export of goods, customs officers are important actors in the fight against drug trafficking. However, their role also makes them vulnerable: they have crucial knowledge on processes and procedures, access to systems and discretionary power that can be exploited by criminals.\n\nThe desk research shows that corruption is used strategically to circumvent two important bottlenecks: the container screening and security as cargo enters the port, and the exit of drugs from the port. Traffickers may seek to obtain key information or direct assistance from customs officers.\n\n### Collusion – coercion – infiltration\n\nThese corrupt relationships and the emerging networks between members of crime groups and the customs officials are diverse. Some relationships can be characterised by collusion, where customs officials offer their services or are persuaded to cooperate. This collusion may be opportunistic or targeted.\n\nOther relationships can be characterised by coercion. Customs officials may be lured by financial reward, but this is accompanied by intimidation or the threat of violence to ensure that the officer cooperates and continues to cooperate. Our research highlights that the boundary between collusion and coercion is often blurred.\n\nBeyond collusion and coercion, we also see infiltration, which crosses the boundaries between the criminal, public and private. What emerges is less a matter of individual corruption and more akin to regulatory capture, where the public office position is held by a member of the criminal network.\n\nThe review of the judicial cases shows that bribes involved in these schemes can amount to millions. To hide and use the illicit gains, traffickers rely on money laundering, disguising its source as legitimate. They often enlist the help of family and friends, a trusted inner circle or professional specialists. They may also hide cash at home or invest it in assets and businesses in the Netherlands or abroad.\n\n### Adaptive corruption strategies\n\nA key finding of our research is that the criminal and corruption strategies used to facilitate drug trafficking are highly adaptive. The underlying driver of this adaptability is the unchanging demand for drugs and high profitability of the crime. This pushes traffickers to adopt new strategies to overcome hurdles in supplying the demand.\n\nCorruption strategies adapt in response to new enforcement measures. When control systems are changed and\u002For strengthened, corruption strategies evolve alongside them. This research identifies some key patterns:\n\n*   Stronger detection efforts increase the incentives for corruption.\n*   Evolving systems encourage a similar shift in corruption strategies.\n*   Anti-corruption and anti-trafficking measures may change the profile of those most vulnerable to being co-opted.\n*   The characteristics of corruption can also evolve, from collusion to coercion, to full infiltration of institutions and systems – with blurred lines in between.\n\n### Trafficking strategies evolve, too\n\nTrafficking strategies are similarly adaptive. There have been increased efforts by the port to combat trafficking through enhanced detection and technology. This was initially reflected by increased drug seizures. But since 2024, drugs seizures have declined.\n\nThe research findings provide an explanation for this: As detection strengthens, more drug seizures are made. But what may happen, too, is a response to these new measures. As the risk of detection increases, criminals may adapt their trafficking strategies to overcome the additional hurdles, including:\n\n*   changing concealment strategies; and\n*   changing modes of transport and trafficking routes, including to ports outside of the Netherlands.\n\n### Red flags and risk indicators\n\nThese developments highlight the complexity in understanding the impact of stronger anti-trafficking measures on both corruption and trafficking strategies.\n\nTrafficking and corruption are typically measured by detection, for example, by changes in the volume of drug seizures or the number of public officials caught engaging in corruption.\n\nBut the elephant in the room is that increasingly sophisticated criminal strategies can hide what is really happening. This underscores the need to continuously strengthen our ability to recognise “red flags” of corruption and trafficking. Data-driven tools and refined risk indicators are critical for understanding how crime and corruption strategies are changing.\n\n### A holistic understanding and improved foresight\n\nThe evolving nature of criminal strategies is often likened to a game of chess: enforcement makes a move, and criminal networks adapt. But what now seems to be emerging is more troubling.\n\nWhen barriers to drug trafficking increase while demand remains unchanged, crime and corruption strategies adapt in ways that can deepen their impact on society, leading for example to the hardening of crime and associated violence.\n\nThis makes anticipating how crime may adapt to changing anti-corruption and anti-trafficking strategies critical. Improved foresight and scenario-building capacities will be vital in order to develop more robust enforcement efforts against drug trafficking and mitigate the negative impact on society.\n\nA holistic approach is essential. Addressing corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking requires a broad view of crime that focuses on understanding vulnerabilities, leveraging data and harnessing collaboration.\n\nThe risk of trafficking routes changing are high, therefore, we must use every tool at our disposal to ensure effective and sustainable enforcement efforts.\n\n### Learn more\n\n*   Download the full _[Working Paper 58: Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam: Drivers, strategies and implications](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-58)_\n*   View related online workshop for enforcement and research communities: _[Red flags at the frontier: detecting and disrupting border corruption in the EU](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fnode\u002F2844)_, 23 September 2025\n\n### _Acknowledgement and disclaimer_\n\n_FALCON is funded under the European Union’s Horizon Europe Framework Program Grant Agreement ID 101121281. The Basel Institute on Governance, as an associated partner without the right to receive funds directly from the European Research Executive Agency, has received funding from the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI). The contents of the Working Paper are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union, the European Research Executive Agency or SERI._","2025-09-11","how-corruption-helps-drug-traffickers-adapt-to-strengthened-border-enforcement-2848","How corruption helps drug traffickers adapt to strengthened border enforcement","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F13171c8d-1c71-4c6a-9688-3c1ff7b9775a?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[284],7796,[140,141],[177,143],[288,290,292],{"tags_id":289},{"id":68,"name":69},{"tags_id":291},{"id":147,"name":148},{"tags_id":293},{"id":153,"name":154},2848,[17],[177,143],[298,299],1355,1356,[],[],"2025-09-11T16:01:34.000Z","2026-05-07T21:29:57.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fhow-corruption-helps-drug-traffickers-adapt-to-strengthened-border-enforcement-2848",{"id":307,"body":308,"status":6,"type":10,"date":309,"slug":310,"title":311,"image":312,"countries":313,"topic":315,"activity":316,"tags":317,"nid":318,"topics":319,"activities":320,"authors":321,"images":324,"websites":13,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":20,"translations":325,"translation_of":13,"user_created":161,"date_created":326,"user_updated":188,"date_updated":303,"content":327,"link":328},10562,"Amid geopolitical turbulence and concerns around the rise of authoritarianism and armed conflict, many people are looking at how corruption can be used “strategically” to deliberately undermine democratic institutions.\n\nThe so-called [strategic use of corruption](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fqg37) is not new. It’s often portrayed simplistically as a kind of Western movie with good guys vs. bad guys, victims vs. aggressors. The picture is, of course, more complicated than that.\n\nIn a [recent article for the _Public Integrity_ journal](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwhen-you-have-corrupt-friends-abroad-impact-strategic-corruption-sudans-democratic), we explore this phenomenon from the perspective of a country where strategic corruption was arguably linked to the collapse of a fledging democracy: Sudan.\n\nIn 2019, the civilian-military government of Sudan led by Prime Minister Hamdok began an ambitious transition to democratic governance and the adoption of anti-corruption reforms. This transition ended in 2023 with state collapse and conflict. The story is a lesson on the complexity of corruption and on how closely anti-corruption efforts, democratic processes and security are linked.\n\n### Growth of foreign-supported power centres\n\nThe article tells the story of the governance system that emerged during the military-political rule of former President al-Bashir. At the time, there were powerful groups within the military, and coups were a frequent occurrence. A savvy solution was needed to address this.\n\nIn order to appease these powerful military actors, including the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), al-Bashir’s regime provided opportunities for them to expand their economic and business interests while politically keeping them under his direct control.\n\nLeveraging the country's rich natural resources became a means of maintaining political and economic power.\n\n### Geopolitical significance\n\nSudan’s geopolitical position is a critical part of the story. The Red Sea is a key trading route. Russia and states in the Gulf region developed engagements with these powerful military actors. They exchanged money and other support for access to Sudan's natural resources and strategic geographic locations.\n\nCorruption practices involved preferential investments and concessions in specific economic sectors such as mining and agriculture. There is also evidence of illicit financial flows associated with the gold trade, as well as the provision of financial resources and arms to non-state military actors. These deals served the geopolitical and domestic interests of both sides.\n\nOne example from the article is that in 2017, al-Bashir sought Russia’s support in response to increasing internal political and economic pressures, as well as external pressures exerted by the West. Moscow offered a partnership with Sudan, including political support, arms and military training by private military contractors, who were deployed to Sudan immediately.\n\nIn exchange, Russia gained access to a strategic commercial corridor in the Red Sea and preferential gold mining contracts.\n\nNevertheless, the situation remained turbulent domestically and culminated in the popular uprising of 2018–2019. Al-Bashir was ousted from office. A Transitional Military Council, which involved both the SAF and RSF, was formed to lead the country until the handover to a civilian-military-led government in August 2019.\n\n### Democratic transition undermined\n\nWith the civilian-military-led government at the helm of political power, a bold transition to democracy began, with positive signs of strengthening the fight against corruption emerging.\n\nHowever, the aforementioned networks were directly impacted by Sudan’s democratic model and its citizens' aspirations. The networks and their leaders did not simply disappear with al-Bashir's removal. Behind the scenes, they were carefully orchestrating their next moves.\n\nDespite the reforms, during the transition period these military-business networks expanded even further. They leveraged the support of external actors and developed their economic investments with the twin goal of undermining reforms and maintaining dominance over the national economy.\n\nThese actors became active antagonists of the democratic and anti-corruption reform process. After the course of reform went into reverse, armed conflict erupted once again in April 2023.\n\n### A deeper understanding of corruption and democracy\n\nWhat happened in Sudan highlights this link between geopolitical objectives, corruption and the impact on democracy. It also challenges narratives that see strategic corruption simply as a tool wielded by foreign actors to undermine democracies.\n\nInstead, we must deepen our understanding of how domestic environments can create the conditions for strategic corruption.\n\nIn Sudan, the revolution and the planned transition to democracy posed a threat to the individuals and networks benefiting from the status quo. This triggered them to use corruption and the help of external actors to undermine the process.\n\n### Promoting anti-corruption work = promoting security\n\nThe case of Sudan, like that of other countries undergoing democratic transitions, highlights the importance of supporting reforms that seek to strengthen democracy and counter corruption. Otherwise, the reform process risks being derailed, with horrific consequences for populations as well as instability in the wider region.\n\nThe paradox of our time is that, amid current geopolitical shifts, development assistance and support for anti-corruption reform are under pressure while security and defence are prioritised.\n\nWhat happened in Sudan shows that this logic is a fallacy. Systemic corruption drives insecurity and instability. We cannot achieve security without fighting corruption and vice versa.\n\nThis trend is even more concerning as the fragmentation of the rules-based international order creates an environment conducive to strategic forms of corruption.\n\n### Learn more\n\n*   View the article in the Public Integrity journal: Karar, H., & Kassa, S. (2025). [When You Have Corrupt Friends Abroad: The Impact of Strategic Corruption on Sudan’s Democratic Collapse](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1080\u002F10999922.2025.2494910). Public Integrity, 1–14.\n*   See the Basel Institute’s [Quick Guide to Strategic Corruption](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fqg37).","2025-07-01","strategic-corruption-democracy-and-security-in-sudan-2823","Strategic corruption, democracy and security in Sudan","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F46e594b4-dcfd-430d-9d02-adb3b0a6e556?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[314],7782,[140,141],[143],[],2823,[17],[143],[322,323],1344,1345,[],[],"2025-07-13T11:42:46.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fstrategic-corruption-democracy-and-security-in-sudan-2823",{"id":330,"body":331,"status":6,"type":10,"date":332,"slug":333,"title":334,"image":335,"countries":336,"topic":337,"activity":339,"tags":340,"nid":354,"topics":355,"activities":356,"authors":357,"images":359,"websites":13,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":20,"translations":360,"translation_of":13,"user_created":161,"date_created":361,"user_updated":188,"date_updated":362,"content":363,"link":364},10564,"_Our Senior Communications and External Relations Specialist Monica Guy looks back on how a curious mind paired with diverse learning opportunities and the desire to make an impact can pave the way into anti-corruption. This article is part of a series on careers in fighting financial crime and opportunities to learn and study with the Basel Institute._\n\nOne of the many things I’ve learned at the Basel Institute on Governance is that rewarding jobs in the field of countering financial crime are not just for those who woke up aged 10 and said: “Mummy, I want to be an anti-corruption prosecutor”. Or who studied business and law with the dream of becoming a compliance officer.\n\nMy own journey has been rather zig-zaggy, from caring for Stephen Hawking to managing multilingual content projects for Google and big companies in the travel and shipping industries. And a lot in between.\n\nEducation and continuous learning have been crucial in giving me the flexibility to bounce from one thing to another and hopefully make at least a tiny bit of impact on the way.\n\n### From dusty libraries to blended learning\n\nI didn’t learn much of practical use during my first degree in Classics at Cambridge. But it was a good way to learn to think, read, write and argue with clever people about the world with all its wonders and weirdness. That’s something I have to do a lot in my communications role at the Basel Institute, though thankfully not in ancient Greek.\n\nMy first master’s in interactive communications at Quinnipiac University was one of the earliest “blended learning” degree courses. I.e. hybrid classes and the (then) revolutionary idea that it’s better to learn the theory in advance and use precious class time to practise and discuss.\n\nWhat was in 2010 the cutting edge of communications now looks like stone-age cave paintings. But it did give me the basics to start building websites (early web design = animated cave paintings) and think a bit more strategically about things like audience, purpose and how communications and social media tactics can be used for good or ill. That has been of real practical value in our efforts to build the Basel Institute’s visibility and reputation over the last years.\n\n### Digging deeper (but I wish Basel STUDY had existed then)\n\nYou can’t be successful in communicating if you don’t understand what you’re talking about. So during covid times I took another master’s course, this time in sustainable development at SOAS University of London. I wanted that deeper understanding of topics like poverty, globalisation and environment that are fundamental to the work the Basel Institute does.\n\nThis degree was fully online and designed to fit alongside a full-time job. But I’ll be honest: if our [Basel STUDY](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fstudy) courses had existed then, I’d have gladly taken them instead.\n\nBasel STUDY – that's our postgraduate programmes with the University of Basel: they are six months, hands-on, with live classes and in-person meetings, top-notch instructors and a diverse group of other participants with real-world experience. That’s a lot more fun, useful and digestible than a two-year master's degree, plus easier to combine with other modules and qualifications.\n\n### Free or low-cost learning\n\nI absolutely know that I’ve been privileged to be able to study at good universities, with grants and jobs to pay the way.\n\nBut I’ve also learned a lot through MOOCs (Massive Online Open Courses) and other free or low-cost online learning opportunities from organisations like Coursera and the University of Leiden. And of course the crème de la crème of eLearning: our own free [Basel LEARN courses](https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002F) on countering financial crime.\n\n### A desire to learn\n\nAll this to say that you don’t need to be a “financial crime professional” to play a part in making the world a better place.\n\nJust as you don’t need to be a “communications professional” to communicate effectively about countering corruption, fostering good governance, catalysing asset recovery and all the other difficult but worthwhile things we do here in Basel and around the world.\n\nWhat you do need is a desire to learn – from courses, peers and colleagues.\n\n### Join in\n\nMy “call to action”? Take a look at the opportunities we offer at the Basel Institute for individuals who also burn to learn about countering corruption and financial crime and build practical skills they can apply in their daily work:\n\n*   [Basel LEARN](https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002F) – our online training and learning hub with free eLearning courses and lots more\n*   [Basel STUDY](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fstudy) – our new academic programmes with the University of Basel on anti-corruption and asset recovery\n*   Our forthcoming open course on [Introduction to blockchain: crypto investigation and AML compliance](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fcrypto-aml-training)","2025-06-26","not-just-for-lawyers-learning-your-way-into-anti-corruption-2822","Not just for lawyers: learning your way into anti-corruption","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F99b2b185-92d4-46cc-8c21-6b0c8f20cf39?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[],[338],"",[143],[341,343,347,351],{"tags_id":342},{"id":81,"name":82},{"tags_id":344},{"id":345,"name":346},867,"Financial crime",{"tags_id":348},{"id":349,"name":350},1300,"Education",{"tags_id":352},{"id":353,"name":241},1372,2822,[16],[143],[358],1346,[],[],"2025-07-13T11:42:47.000Z","2026-05-29T22:22:37.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fnot-just-for-lawyers-learning-your-way-into-anti-corruption-2822",{"id":366,"body":367,"status":6,"type":232,"date":368,"slug":369,"title":370,"image":371,"countries":372,"topic":373,"activity":374,"tags":375,"nid":382,"topics":383,"activities":384,"authors":385,"images":387,"websites":388,"area":13,"programme":13,"language":20,"translations":389,"translation_of":13,"user_created":161,"date_created":390,"user_updated":188,"date_updated":303,"content":391,"link":392},10558,"In many countries with high levels of corruption, there is also a strong demand for government to do something about it. With the right conditions, that can fuel solid political commitments. We’ve seen, however, that even in cases where governments do all the right things on paper – strengthen legal frameworks, establish dedicated anti-corruption agencies, etc. – there's a gap between what they promise and what happens in practice.\n\nIn a chapter for the forthcoming _Routledge Handbook of Anti-Corruption Research and Practice_, we go deeper into exploring one reason for this gap, namely the political instrumentalisation of efforts to prevent and curb corruption. We explain why and how it happens and provide examples from countries across the globe. This article presents the key findings.\n\n### Why? Informal governance and corruption\n\nIf you want to understand why and how anti-corruption institutions and laws can be used and abused to achieve strategic goals, you have to understand how informal networks of elites function and how this relates to corruption.\n\nHigh levels of corruption are often [associated with informal governance practices](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.5699\u002Fslaveasteurorev2.95.1.0049). Informal governance is established through powerful networks that connect political elites, business interests and ordinary citizens. These informal networks can have [different objectives](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.4000\u002Fpoldev.2646). They help:\n\n*   political elites win and stay in power;\n*   business interests to access profitable benefits such as government contracts; and\n*   citizens cope and gain access to public services where governance is weak and resources are scarce.\n\nWhen informal networks rule, decisions, including on allocating public resources, are made for personal gain. Resources are redistributed informally for the benefit of insiders and at the expense of those outside these networks. Power is used to protect and ensure impunity for the loyal. Informal governance practices become entrenched and persist independently of individual network members. The result is a [vicious cycle](https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=136#section-3) of informal governance and corruption that undermines the effectiveness of formal institutions.\n\nInformal governance practices are particularly evident in contexts characterised by state capture, [defined as](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1057\u002Fs41268-023-00290-6) “a type of systematic corruption whereby narrow interest groups take control of the institutions and processes through which public policy is made, directing public policy away from the public interest and instead shaping it to serve their own interests”.\n\n### Instrumentalisation as a way out of the dilemma\n\nPolitical power networks that face pressure to do something to curb corruption find themselves in a dilemma. They need to respond to demands for anti-corruption, but corruption is functional to the network's very survival.\n\nTo prevent negative consequences and sanctions for the informal political power network itself, those pulling the strings need to ensure that anti-corruption institutions and their efforts are not too effective. They must be reined in, for example by instrumentalising anti-corruption endeavours.\n\nHere, political instrumentalisation means that dedicated anti-corruption agencies, or other public institutions charged with preventing and combating corruption or ensuring transparency and accountability, are informally repurposed to benefit those within the network. The result is that _formal_ governance is weakened and the basic principles of the rule of law erode.\n\nThe purpose can be two-fold (not mutually exclusive):\n\n*   To undermine the anti-corruption institution's formal powers and weaken its impact on the power network.\n*   To shape the institution’s operations in a way that favours and strengthens the power network.\n\n### Three strategies: co-optation, control and camouflage\n\nBased on [research](https:\u002F\u002Fjournals.openedition.org\u002Fpoldev\u002F2646) on informal governance and corruption combined with [insights](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1057\u002Fs41268-023-00290-6) on mechanisms of state capture, we can identify three general strategies informal power networks use to shape anti-corruption institutions or undermine their formal powers:\n\n*   _Co-optation__: aligning institutional incentives with that of the power network_ This can be achieved by appointing allies and building informal loyalties both between the anti-corruption institution and the power network, and with other stakeholders in the law enforcement system i.e. the prosecution or judiciary.\n*   _Control__: weakening the influence of the institution in relation to the power network_ This is possible by limiting the resources or mandate of the anti-corruption institution, and by limiting the space for anti-corruption accountability stakeholders such as the media and civil society.\n\nPower networks shape the institution’s operations in a manner favourable to maintaining the network through:\n\n*   _Camouflage__: formal rules create the façade of commitment to anti-corruption..._but they work to protect the network, because:\n    *   they do not apply to corrupt network insiders (impunity);\n    *   they are selectively applied to corrupt outsiders or to discipline network dissenters (weaponisation or “rule by law”).\n\n### Overarching insights and reflections\n\nHard to “see”\n\nGiven that political instrumentalisation of anti-corruption is enacted through formal structures and processes, it can be hard to observe. It can also _look_ different on the surface. Control can happen through restrictions that weaken institutions. But it can also work through the provision of _more_ resources, for example to institutions that have been co-opted to protect network insiders. \n\nA web of formal and informal rules\n\nAnti-corruption actions can be ambivalent when formal rules are selectively applied to camouflage corrupt informal practices. Formal and informal interests and rules are at play simultaneously, with different narratives being offered to insiders and outsiders. A successful corruption prosecution can give the appearance of a commitment to fighting corruption while in reality serving to target individuals outside the power network.\n\nRule of law or rule by law?\n\nWith high levels of informality, it’s difficult to tell if anti-corruption outcomes reflect genuine efforts to enforce the law equally and predictably (rule of law), or if they indicate a strategic use of formal rules for the benefit of the informal network (rule by law). Does a low number of high-profile corruption cases mean that control of corruption is strong, that investigation and prosecution capacities are weak, or that someone is being protected?\n\n### Any bright sides?\n\nThe book chapter concludes by providing practical entry points on what can be done, even in challenging contexts, to strengthen anti-corruption efforts.\n\nThree entry points are worth exploring:\n\n*   Let’s keep in mind: Power networks are fluid and can change. When their incentives align with the anti-corruption objectives of promoting integrity and curbing corruption, informal governance practices can also have a positive impact. It’s important to look for changes in the power structure to seize windows of opportunity.\n*   Ambivalence in institutional decision-making can be reduced by pushing for transparent, standard operating procedures for anti-corruption institutions.\n*   Even if formal political commitments to anti-corruption seem more rhetorical than genuine, they can still provide a useful anchor to promote and drive efforts for real change. [Research](https:\u002F\u002Fonlinelibrary.wiley.com\u002Fdoi\u002F10.1111\u002Fgove.12298) shows that when governments fail to deliver on their commitments, they come under pressure to explain why change has not happened. This keeps anti-corruption high on the political agenda and in societal discourse.\n\nA starting point is to gain a thorough understanding of the broader political and governance context. In this regard, we have developed a [framework for assessing and monitoring contextual factors](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-52) that impact the performance of anti-corruption institutions. It allows us to better interpret anti-corruption actions, identify emerging positive or negative trends and respond more effectively to risks and opportunities.\n\n### Learn more\n\n*   Saba Kassa’s chapter “Insights on the Political Instrumentalisation of Anti-Corruption Institutions: In Between a Rock and a Hard Place?” will be published in _The Routledge Handbook of Anti-Corruption Research and Practice_, available for pre-order on the [publisher’s website](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.routledge.com\u002FThe-Routledge-Handbook-of-Anti-Corruption-Research-and-Practice\u002FPozsgai-Alvarez-Bratu\u002Fp\u002Fbook\u002F9781032294759?srsltid=AfmBOopfgzfpq6fkyGC4SFeBLkjN5dVqnAKQjj8a3CgDmeWvbA3zjXRC).\n*   Kassa, Saba. 2024. “[Navigating the political context: Practice insights and adaptive strategies to strengthen the anti-corruption and asset recovery justice chain](https:\u002F\u002Fbaselgovernance.org\u002Fpublications\u002Fwp-52)”, Working Paper 52, Basel Institute on Governance.\n*   Baez-Camargo, Claudia and Alena Ledeneva. 2017. “[Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin? Informal Governance and the Public\u002FPrivate Crossover in Mexico, Russia and Tanzania.](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.5699\u002Fslaveasteurorev2.95.1.0049)” _Slavonic and East European Review_ 95, no. 1: 49-75.\n*   Baez-Camargo, Claudia and Lucy Koechlin. 2018. “[Informal Governance: Comparative Perspectives on Co-optation, Control and Camouflage in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.4000\u002Fpoldev.2646)” _International Development Policy Journal_, 78-100.\n*   Basel Institute on Governance. 2023. “[Informal Governance](https:\u002F\u002Flearn.baselgovernance.org\u002Fcourse\u002Fview.php?id=136#section-3).”\n*   Dávid-Barrett, Elizabeth. 2023. “[State capture and development: a conceptual framework.](https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1057\u002Fs41268-023-00290-6)” _Journal of International Relations and Development_ 26, 224-244.","2025-06-10","how-informal-power-networks-can-instrumentalise-anti-corruption-institutions-2816","How informal power networks can instrumentalise anti-corruption institutions","https:\u002F\u002Fjam.baselgovernance.org\u002Fapi\u002Fassets\u002F6c184fdc-82c9-4a8c-a0d3-52ece905fcee?width=1000&height=650&format=webp&quality=80",[],[140,141],[177,143],[376,378],{"tags_id":377},{"id":81,"name":82},{"tags_id":379},{"id":380,"name":381},1309,"Informality",2816,[17],[177,143],[386],1341,[],[19],[],"2025-06-10T10:01:37.000Z",[],"\u002Fresources\u002Fnews\u002Fhow-informal-power-networks-can-instrumentalise-anti-corruption-institutions-2816",{"left":394,"top":394,"width":395,"height":395,"rotate":394,"vFlip":396,"hFlip":396,"body":397},0,20,false,"\u003Cpath fill=\"currentColor\" fill-rule=\"evenodd\" d=\"M17 10a.75.75 0 0 1-.75.75H5.612l4.158 3.96a.75.75 0 1 1-1.04 1.08l-5.5-5.25a.75.75 0 0 1 0-1.08l5.5-5.25a.75.75 0 1 1 1.04 1.08L5.612 9.25H16.25A.75.75 0 0 1 17 10\" clip-rule=\"evenodd\"\u002F>",1780931839597]